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NOTES
Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act: Juris-
diction Shoreward of the Mean High Tide Line
This article deals with the jurisdiction of the United States Army
Corps of Engineers to require permits under the Rivers and Har-
bors Act for dredge and fill activities. The author argues that the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached the
correct result via a new analytic approach, and in the process
extended the corps'jurisdiction shoreward of the mean high tide
line, to include all activities, without regard to location, which
affect the course, condition, or capacity of navigable waters.
Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., as part of a proposed trailer park
development on Upper Key Largo, Florida, planned construction of
ten artificial canals, each with individual connections to Blackwater
Sound, a navigable body of water. Construction had begun, and
three of the canals had been dredged and connected to the sound,'
when the United States Army Corps of Engineers advised the devel-
oper that federal law required a permit for such activities. The
Corps based its jursidiction on section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899.2 Sexton Cove Estates replied by letter to
the Corps that it believed no permit was necessary3 and continued
dredging. Excavation of two additional canals was completed, ' but
1. These canals ranged in depth from 13.8 to 38 feet. The canals were approximately 600
to 700 feet in length. They were excavated landward of what the developers believed to be
the mean high tide line (MHTL) of the sound. Blackwater Sound at the point of connection
of these canals was four to five feet deep. One of the three canals was excavated by enlarging
a preexisting canal. The preexisting canal was from two feet to eight feet deep with an
unspecified length.'
2. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970). Section 10 provides in pertinent part:
The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the
navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited...
and it shall not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify
the course, location, condition, or capacity of, any port, road3tead, haven, harbor,
canal, lake, harbor of refuge, or inclosure within the limits of any breakwater, or
of the channel of any navigable water of the United States, unless the work has
been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of
the Army prior to beginning the same.
3. Sexton Cove Estates based its response to the Corps upon advice of its counsel that
the Corps' jurisdiction did not extend to activities occurring above the MHTL of navigable
waters. See United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 151, 158 (S.D. Fla. 1971),
vacated in part and remanded, 478 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973).
4. These two canals were 600 to 700 feet in length and 15 to 45 feet deep. They were both
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the canals were not connected to the sound.' Subsequently the
Corps again advised Sexton Cove Estates that a permit was required
for its dredging activities, particularly for any connections of canals
to Blackwater Sound. At this point the development company ap-
plied to the Corps for an after-the-fact permit for its work.' The
company continued work, however, and the two additional canals
were connected to the sound. In addition, dredging of the remaining
canals, except for their connections, was completed.7 Approximately
one year later the after-the-fact permit request was denied.
The federal government then brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Sexton
Cove Estates and its president, alleging that the defendants had
conducted dredge and fill activities which had altered the course,
condition, or capacity of navigable waters without the requisite
Corps' permit.8 The Government sought prohibitory injunctive re-
lief restraining further dredging operations and mandatory injunc-
tive relief requiring restoration of the dredged areas? The district
court held that the dredge and fill operations conducted by the
defendants without authorization by permit were illegal and or-
dered total restoration of all dredged areas.' 0
excavated by enlarging two preexisting canals. The preexisting canals were from two feet to
eight feet deep with unspecified lengths.
5. The canals were each separated from Blackwater Sound by earth plugs eight or nine
feet long that had not been dredged out of the canals' intended courses.
6. At that time, permits for authorization of construction performed without the Corps'
approval could be obtained if certain specified conditions were satisfied. 33 C.F.R. §
209.120(c)(1)(iv) (1972). Subsequently, in 1974 the Corps amended its regulations and se-
verely restricted the after-the-fact permit procedure. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(g)(12) (1976).
7. These canals were the same lengths as the others and had depths from 20 to 40 feet.
The trial record did not indicate how long the plugs separating the canals from the sound
were. The defendants characterized the plugs as many feet long, while the Government
referred to the plugs as narrow strips.
8. Specifically, the Government alleged a violation of 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970). See note 2
supra.
9. Statutory authority for such injunctive relief has been judicially implied from the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, § 12, 33 U.S.C. 99 403, 406 (1970); e.g., United
States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 478 F.2d 418, 430-31 (5th Cir. 1973). 33 U.S.C. § 406 (1970)
provides in pertinent part:
Every person and every corporation that shall violate any of the provisions of
sections 401, 403, and 404 of this title . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor . . . . And further, the removal of any structures or parts of structures
erected in violation of the provisions of the said sections may be enforced by the
injunction of any district court exercising jurisdiction in any district in which such
structures may exist . . ..
10. United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 602 (S.D. Fla. 1975). The
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On appeal, the defendants contended, inter alia, that the
Corps' jurisdiction did not apply to dredge and fill operations which
occurred above the mean high tide line (MHTL); that even if Corps'
jurisdiction were applicable, there was no alteration of the course,
condition, or capacity of navigable waters; and that restoration was
not warranted." The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed in part, vacated in part, remanded, and held:2 (1)
dredge and fill operations shoreward of the mean high tide line of
navigable waters are within the jurisdiction of the United States
Army Corps of Engineers if those operations alter the course or
affect the navigable capacity of navigable waters; (2) only defend-
ant's dredging operations which involved connection of canals to
Blackwater Sound altered the course and capacity of the sound; and
(3) therefore, construction of those canals which were connected to
Blackwater Sound without the Corps' authorization was illegal and
warranted some degree of restoration. United States v. Sexton Cove
Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976).11
restoration order of the trial court was quite extensive. The defendants were ordered to
replant all red mangrove trees along the shoreline where they had been destroyed. The
defendants also were ordered to refill completely the five landlocked canals using material of
the same permeability as that which had been removed. In addition, the defendants were to
refill the three preexisting canals to depths of ten feet at the sound entrances sloping up to
six feet at their inland ends. Finally, the defendants were to refill the remaining two canals
to a depth of six feet at their mouths sloping up to five feet at their inland ends. The
defendants estimated that compliance with the restoration order would cost at least one
million dollars. Brief for Appellants at 17, United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526
F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1976).
11. The defendants also contended that the corporate president could not be held person-
ally liable, that reliance on previous Corps' internal jurisdictional policies was a valid defense,
and that all persons owning lots adjacent to the canals were indispensable parties to the
action. 526 F.2d at 1295. The Fifth Circuit denied the defendants' reliance argument because
the defendants never requested the Corps' opinion as to whether a permit was required and
because the defendants continued dredging after the Corps informed them a permit was
required. The court also determined that the lot owners were not indispensable parties be-
cause the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 were not met. The court,
however, upheld the contention that the corporate president could not be held personally
liable based on general corporate principles and an absence of any language imposing such
liability in 33 U.S.C. § 406 (1970). 526 F.2d at 1300-01.
12. The court remanded the case so that a full evidentiary hearing might be held to
determine the degree of restoration environmentally and practically warranted. Id. at 1301.
13. Two companion cases involving similar factual situations were decided the same day.
Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 526 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir.
1976); United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 526 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1976).
In Weiszmann a private developer had brought suit seeking an injunction to restrain the
Corps from exercising jurisdiction over two artificially created canals in his residential subdi-
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The Fifth Circuit's decision to remove the MHTL as a jurisdic-
tional limit for section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act was in
direct opposition not only to numerous earlier cases'4 but also to a
previous decision of the same court.'5 Thus, it was no surprise when
vision development. The'federal government counterclaimed under 33 U.S.C. §§ 403 and 406
(1970), seeking restoration of the two canals and under the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975), seeking imposition of
a civil penalty. Both canals had been dredged landward of the MHTL without a Corps per-
mit. One had been connected to a preexisting canal and the other had been left landlocked.
The trial court held that the dredging was illegal and ordered total restoration. In addition,
the court imposed a $5,000 fine for violation of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972. Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 7
E.R.C. (BNA) 1523 (S.D. Fla. 1975). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the civil penalty, reversed
the judgment requiring restoration of the landlocked canal, and vacated the judgment requir-
ing restoration of the connected canal so that a full evidentiary hearing might be held to
determine the degree of restoration warranted.
In Moretti the federal government had brought suit against a private land developer
seeking an injunction restraining the developer from dredging and filling in navigable waters
below the MHTL. The trial court granted injunctive relief and ordered that all fill material
placed below the MHTL in navigable waters be removed. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti,
Inc., 331 F. Supp. 151 (S.D. Fla. 1971). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
determination that restoration was an appropriate remedy for Moretti's illegal dredging and
filling, but vacated the restoration order so that Moretti might apply for an after-the-fact
permit. United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 478 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973). Subsequently,
Moretti sought such a permit, but its request was denied by the Corps, and this denial was
affirmed by the courts. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc. v. Hoffman, 387 F. Supp. 1404 (S.D. Fla.
1974), aff'd, 526 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1976).
After the Corps' permit denial, the trial court reinstated its restoration order. In addition,
on the Government's motion the trial court expanded its restoration order to include dredged
and filled canals above the MHTL which were connected to navigable waters. United States
v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1404 (S.D. Fla. 1974). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the determination that restoration was appropriate but remanded to determine the
degree of restoration warranted. 526 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1976).
14. United States v. Smith, 7 E.R.C. (BNA) 1937, 1938 (E.D. Va. 1975); Leslie Salt Co.
v. Froehlke, 7 E.R.C. (BNA) 1311, 1314 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (dictum); United States v. Holland,
373 F. Supp. 665, 671, 676 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (by implication); United States v. Pot-Nets, Inc.,
363 F. Supp. 812, 815.16 (D. Del. 1973); United States v. Lewis, 355 F. Supp. 1132, 1137, 1140
(S.D. Ga. 1973).
15. In United States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc., 478 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1973), speaking
about activities entirely below the MHTL, the court stated: "And all concede for this case
that relief sought depends on the government proving that Moretti dredged or filled bayward
of MHTL. For the Corps has no power landward of it to regulate his conduct or force recon-
struction of the topography. ... Id. at 429. Later in the opinion the court stated:
For where the boundary of its [the Corps'] authority is this elusive line [the
MHTL], it should have the first opportunity to determine whether and to what
extent the area is or is not within its jurisdiction. . ..
This line limits the jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers both negatively and
affirmatively . . ..
Id. at 432 (citations omitted).
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the Sexton Cove decision was almost immediately characterized as
a "radical foray" into concepts foreign to traditional interpretations
of the Rivers and Harbors Act."6
At the center of the controversy are the provisions of section
10 which prohibit "the creation of any obstruction. . . to the navig-
able capacity of any of the waters of the United States" and make
it unlawful "to alter or modify the course, location, condition or
capacity of. . . the channel of any navigable water of the United
States" without prior approval by the Corps." These provisions pro-
vide a twofold requirement before the Corps' jurisdiction is applica-
ble.'8 First, the body of water under consideration must be a naviga-
ble water of the United States. Second, the activity under consider-
ation must have the potential to affect the navigable water in the
manner specified by the statute.
Although the MHTL is generally considered the landward
boundary for navigable waters and would thus have a bearing on the
first requirement, nowhere in the second requirement is a considera-
tion of the MHTL suggested. Certain courts and the Corps itself,
however, have adopted the MHTL as the jurisdictional limit for the
second requirement.' 9 This adoption arose primarily because the
MHTL was the federal boundary for other purposes"° and secondar-
ily because of a belief that there was only a remote possibility that
activities occurring outside the normal range of navigable waters
would have an effect upon navigable waters.2' The Fifth Circuit in
Sexton Cove concluded, however, that there was "nothing in the
language of . . . [the Rivers and Harbors Act] nor in the logic of
its implementation" that mandated the continued support of the
MHTL as a boundary."
It was perhaps to put this dicta to rest that the Fifth Circuit in Sexton Cove removed
the MHTL as the Corps' jurisdictional limit since the removal was not vital to the court's
eventual decision. The Fifth Circuit could simply have affirmed the Corps' jurisdiction over
the canals which were connected to Blackwater Sound by affirming the district court finding
that activities in those canals took place below the MHTL.
16. United States v. Commodore Club, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 311, 320 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
17. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970). See note 2 supra for the pertinent text of this section.
18. See United States v. Commodore Club, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 311 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
19. See cases cited in note 14 supra.
20. E.g., Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 22-27 (1935) (the MHTL is
the federal boundary for property purposes).
21. See United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 670-71 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
22. 526 F.2d at 1298.
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A broad interpretation of the jurisdictional limits of section 10
was set forth at an early time by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co. 3 That case involved an
analysis of section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act
of 1890,14 the statutory precursor of part of section 10 of the 1899
Act.25 In construing the former statute, the Court concluded that it
was general in its terms and prohibited. obstructions to the naviga-
ble capacity of the navigable waters of the United States "wherever
done or however done.""6 The Court went on to hold that the United
States could have the construction of a dam on a nonnavigable river
enjoined where the dam would significantly affect the navigable
capacity of a navigable river. 7
Subsequent court decisions have affirmed this broad reading of
section 10. The courts involved have held that activities which have
occurred outside navigable waters that either caused an obstruction
of the navigable capacity of navigable waters, or altered or modified
the course, location, condition, or capacity of navigable waters were
within the jurisdiction of the Act.2" Such holdings are certainly sup-
portable under the plain meaning of section 10.
Viewing the Sexton Cove case from the standpoint of the two
requirements necessary to establish the applicability of section 10
and a violation by Sexton Cove Estates, it is apparent that the
23. 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
24. Act of September 19, 1890, ch 907, § 10, 26 Stat. 454. The section declared in part
"[tihat the creation of any obstruction, not affirmatively authorized by law, to the navigable
capacity of any waters, in respect to which the United States has jurisdiction, is hereby
prohibited."
25. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
26. 174 U.S. 690, 708 (1899).
27. Id. at 709-10.
28. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960) (discharge of particulates
through sewers into a navigable river); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929) (reduction
of water level of the Great Lakes by drawing off of water through the Chicago River Drainage
Canal); Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925) (same); United States v. Perma
Paving Co., 332 F,2d 754 (2d Cir. 1964) (overloading of riparian land caused shoaling in a
navigable river); United States v. Banister Realty Co., 155 F. 583 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1907)
(dictum) (use of private property to effect closing of a navigable channel by deposition of
sand); Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (drawing off of water from
a navigable river by.two pumping plants and their respective intake canals); United States
v. Sunset Cove, Inc., 5 E.R.C. (BNA) 1023 (D. Ore. 1973) (placement of fill which confined a
channel to only part of the area it occupied during its seasonal meanderings), aff'd, 514 F.2d
1089 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1976). United States v. Underwood, 344 F.
Supp. 486 (M.D. Fla. 1972) (excavations from the shoreline of a navigable river).
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Government could have proceeded in either of two ways. First,
Blackwater Sound could have been established as a navigable body
of water," and then the defendant's dredge and fill activities de-
tailed in terms of their effect on this body of water. Second, the
Government could have contended that the ten canals were naviga-
ble bodies of water,3" and then analyzed the defendant's dredge and
fill operations to show their effect on these canals.
At trial, it appeared that the Government either was not aware
that there were two possible approaches or was unsure which one to
use. As a result, its presentation was weak and only a limited
amount of evidence was introduced showing possible effects of de-
fendant's dredge and fill activities on either Blackwater Sound or
the canals.' The district court remedied this defect, apparently
through judicial notice, 2 and held that the ten canals were naviga-
ble waters of the United States and that the defendant's dredging
operations "altered or modified the course, condition, location, or
capacity" both of the canals and of Blackwater Sound.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit limited its analysis solely to con-
sideration of Blackwater Sound as a navigable body of water and the
effects on it from the dredging operations. 4 The court specifically
29. The parties stipulated that Blackwater Sound was a navigable water of the United
States. United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 602, 605 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
30. With the exception of the three preexisting canals, this contention would present the
problem of ascertaining and establishing at what point in time the artificially constructed
canals became navigable waters. In order to establish that the dredge and fill operations
affected navigable waters, it would be necessary to show that the canals became navigable
waters before the dredging and filling ceased. See generally Brief for Appellants at 27-28.
31. The weakness of the evidence adduced by the Government at trial is apparent from
the efforts the Government made in its brief on appeal to have numerous facts accepted by
judicial notice. For example, the Government contended that it had "been judicially estab-
lished that Acavation of canals removes the peat natural to the bottom and exposes the
underlying sand or rock" and that "[n]either sunlight nor tidal flushing action can effec-
tively penetrate the lower reaches of canals which are as narrow and as deep as the canals
excavated by Sexton Cove Estates." Brief for Appellee at 12-13.
32. 389 F. Supp. at 606-09.
33. Id. at 607-09.
34. For the three preexisting canals the court stated that it was unnecessary to resolve
whether they were navigable waters. 526 F.2d at 1299 n.11. For the other seven canals the
court implied that they were not navigable waters while the dredging was going on. Id. at
1299-1300.
Subsequently in Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 526
F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1976), the court held that a canal very similar to the preexisting canals
in Sexton Cove was a navigable body of water. The court noted that the mere capability of
being used in commerce together with evidence of previous personal or private use by boat
19771
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held that the district court finding that the five canals directly
connected to the sound "alter the course of the Sound because they
changed its shoreline" was supported by the record. 5 In addition,
the court noted that the canals served "as access to the Sound for
numerous lot owners whose boats affect the navigable capacity of
the area."3
Both of the Fifth Circuit's conclusions are amply supported by
testimony that established that each of the five canals was con-
nected to Blackwater Sound by a continuous body of water when the
plug for each was removed.37 From this evidence it was logical to
conclude that the connections altered the course of Blackwater
Sound. In fact it would seem to be virtually impossible to connect
a canal directly to a navigable body of water by a surface connection
without modifying the course of the navigable body of water."
For the landlocked (plugged) canals the Fifth Circuit sum-
marily reversed the finding of the district court that the canals
affected Blackwater Sound.39 The court noted that the finding of
Corps' jurisdiction has no evidentiary support and was clearly erro-
neous. 0
The court gave no indication whether its conclusion that the
Corps did not have jurisdiction over the landlocked canals resulted
because there was insufficient proof that the dredging of the canals
affected "the course, condition, location or capacity of Blackwater
Sound"'" or because of its belief that "[t]he Corps jurisdictional
fingers do not reach that far."4 However, in light of the rationale
established navigability. Id. at 1305. The three preexisting canals in the Sexton Cove case
would appear to satisfy these liberal requirements since one witness testified it was possible
to get into the canals with a small boat. Trial Record at 37-38.
35. 526 F.2d at 1299. It is of interest to note that the language of section 10 does not
prohibit alteration of the course of a navigable water but rather alteration of "the course...
of the channel of any navigable water." 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970) (emphasis added). A literal
definition of channel, however, has long since been read out of the Act. Kramon, Section 10
of the Rivers and Harbors Act: The Emergence of a New Protection for Tidal Marshes, 33
MD. L. REV. 229, 232-33 (1973); see United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 486
(1960).
36. 526 F.2d at 1299.
37. Trial Record at 52-56.
38. See Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 526 F.2d 1302,
1305 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Whichard, No. 797 (E.D.N.C., filed Feb. 7, 1974); cf.
Booker v. Rochelle, 23 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1928).
39. 526 F.2d 1299.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. The Corps and the district court both based the Corps' jurisdiction over the
landlocked canals in part on the fact that the canals exhibited tidal fluctuations. The court
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the court put forth in its elimination of the MHTL restriction to the
Corps' jurisdiction, the insufficiency of evidence was in all likeli-
hood the determining factor.'3 Certainly the court would not havo
removed one artificial barrier, the MHTL, to the Corps' jurisdiction
and created another, the plugs in the canals. The logical conclusion
is simply that the evidentiary proof submitted by the Government
was insufficient, not that the court was unwilling as a general rule
to extend jurisdiction to landlocked canals."
Other than evidence of tidal fluctuations, the only evidence the
Government introduced at trial to show an effect by the plugged
canals on Blackwater Sound was testimony given by a marine zoolo-
gist. He testified that if he were to have constructed the canals, he
would have dredged them to a depth of ten feet or less for maximum
biological productivity. 5
of appeals, rather than seriously analyzing this concept, attempted to quickly dispose of the
problem by using a syllogism designed to reduce the concept to an absurdity. The court used
as its major premise the contention that the Corps' jurisdiction could be based on tidal
fluctuations (the ebb and flow of the tide). As its minor premise the court through judicial
notice adopted the fact that every hole dug in South Florida would fill with water and exhibit
tidal fluctuations. The court's conclusion then was that if the Corps' jurisdiction were based
upon ebb and flow of the tide, then the Corps would have jurisdiction over every hole dug in
South Florida. This conclusion in turn was intended to point out the obvious fallacy of the
major premise. The court overlooked one fact in its syllogistic approach, however. The ab-
surdity in the conclusion could have just as easily resulted from a faulty minor premise. In
fact, this was the case. The court's judicial notice of the minor premise was ill-advised. It is
true that every hole dug in South Florida will fill with water, since the water table is quite
close to the surface. See G. PARKER, G. FERGUSION & S. LOVE, WATER RESOURCES OF SOUTHEAST-
ERN FLORIDA 199 (Geological Survey Water-Supply Paper 1255, 1955). However, in only a very
small strip of land along the coasts of Florida will this water exhibit tidal fluctuations. In
fact, the maximum distance from the shore at which a tidal influence has been detected is
6,680 feet. At that point the tidal fluctuation was approximately .02 foot. Significant tidal
fluctuations would only occur much closer to shore. See Parker & Stringfield, Effects of
Earthquakes, Trains, Tides, Winds, and Atmospheric Pressure Changes on Water in the
Geological Formations of Southern Florida, 45 ECON. GEOLOGY & Buu.. Soc'v EcoN.
GEOLOGISTs 441, 448 (1950).
This discussion merely points out the superficial nature of the analysis used by the Fifth
Circuit to "examine" the ebb and flow jurisdictional concept.
43. 526 F.2d at 1298. Especially persuasive is the court's language that "[w]e find no
locality assigned to its [section 10's] prohibitions. . . . There is nothing in the language of
the statute nor the logic of its implementation which creates this barrier [the MHTL]
beyond which the Corps is ubiquitously powerless." Id.
44. See Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 526 F.2d 1302,
1305 (5th Cir. 1976) ("We agree that Canal #2 [a plugged canal] is beyond the jurisdiction
of the Corps because there was no evidence of causal impact of that landlocked canal upon
navigable waters.").
45. Trial Record at 47.
1977]
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Using this testimony and, apparently, judicial notice, the dis-
trict court concluded that the waters of Blackwater Sound were
being diverted into the plugged canals and then recirculated back
out into the sound as "anoxic, polluted" waters." The testimony of
the marine zoologist was simply not sufficient to support such a
conclusion.' In fact there was no scientific evidence, other than a
general assumption, that the water filling the plugged canals did
come from Blackwater Sound.47
If the Government had been able to demonstrate adequately
that the water in the plugged canals came entirely from Blackwater
Sound," it would have presented an arguable case that that fact
alone established an alteration or modification of the condition and
capacity of the sound; a change in the condition of the sound might
constitute an obstruction to navigability." Proof would still be nec-
essary, however, to show the amount of the diverson since courts
have always required that the effect on navigable condition or ca-
pacity be substantial. 0
It also appears that the Fifth Circuit would have accepted eco-
logical damage as an effect on the condition and capacity of Black-
water Sound if the proper proof had been presented. In a case de-
cided the same day as Sexton Cove, the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Joseph G. Moretti, Inc.," departed from the traditional
46. 389 F. Supp. at 607.
47. At trial the following exchange took place between the defendant's attorney and an
employee of the Corps:
Q. Do those canals right there that are not connected up in any way modify the
course, condition, or capacity of Blackwater Sound?
A. Well, I really don't know. I just don't know. They are not connected to the
water. So -
Q. But they are full of water, aren't they?
A. Right.
Q. Do you know where that water came from?
A. I presume it came through the rocks from Blackwater Sound.
Trial Record at 52.
48. For a case in which scientific methods such as dye tests, water budget analyses,
salinity measurements, and geographic evaluations were used to establish a pattern of water
circulation, see PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Train, 393 F. Supp. 1370, 1379-80 (D.D.C. 1975). See
also H. SVERDRUP, M. JOHNSON & R. FLEMING, THE OCEANS 359-61, 366-68 (1942).
49. E.g., Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 428 (1925); Sierra Club v. Mor-
ton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 623 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
50. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp. 610, 629 n.22 (N.D. Cal. 1975), where the
court determined that a withdrawal of 10,900 cubic feet of water per minute from a navigable
river had a substantial effect on navigable capacity.
51. 526 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1976). For a synopsis of this case see note 13 supra.
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navigability concepts of section 10 and held that an alteration and
modification of the condition and capacity of a navigable water
could be brought about by ecological damage. 2 The court in Moretti
simply could have followed its Sexton Cove decision in finding a
violation of section 10 since the canals involved in Moretti were
artificial canals which had been dredged and connected to a naviga-
ble body of water.53 The court chose, however, to ground its decision
upon the effect of ecological damage:
On review we have a voluminous record containing extensive evi-
dence of damaging ecological effects upon navigable waters from
Moretti's dredging of canals above MHTL. In light of the perva-
siveness of this evidence, there can be no doubt that these activi-
ties have altered and modified the condition and capacity of Flor-
ida Bay in violation of Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act.
5 4
By applying this rationale to the Sexton Cove fact pattern, it be-
comes even more apparent that if the proper evidentiary base had
been developed by the Government, the Fifth Circuit would have
held that the Corps' jurisdiction applied to the landlocked canals.
The final basis that the district court used to assert the Corps'
jurisdiction over the landlocked canals was the evidence of their
tidal fluctuations." The district court adopted the theory that wa-
ters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide were navigable waters of
the United States .5 Thus, the court apparently reasoned that once
the canals began to exhibit tidal fluctuations as they were being
52. 526 F.2d at 1310.
53. Id. at 1308-09.
54. Id. at 1310. The Fifth Circuit used as its authority for this interpretation of section
10 its previous decision in Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
910 (1971). In Zabel the Fifth Circuit had held that the Secretary of the Army Corps of
Engineers, in considering whether to grant a permit under section 10, might make that
decision for ecological reasons. Id. at 214. The developer in Zabel had not challenged the
jurisdiction of the Corps over his project but rather the right of the Corps to deny him a permit
when the Corps had admitted his project would have no adverse effect on navigation. Id. at
201.
From Zabel, the Moretti court determined that if the Corps could refuse a permit solely
because there would be an adverse ecological impact, then it necessarily followed that the
Corps could exercise jurisdiction over any activity that would ecologically affect the condition
and capacity of navigable waters. But see United States v. Cannon, 363 F. Supp. 1045, 1051
(D. Del. 1973).
55. 389 F. Supp. 607. See also Weiszmann v. District Eng'r, United States Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 7 E.R.C. (BNA) 1523, 1525 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
56. For a discussion of the ebb and flow theory for determination of navigable waters,
see text accompanying notes 61-70 infra.
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dredged, the Corps' jurisdiction attached and further dredging re-
quired a permit. The Fifth Circuit reversed this jurisdictional deter-
mination of the district court57 and dismissed the ebb and flow issue
in a cursory manner. 9
A closer examination is necessary to determine if, as the district
court concluded, tidal fluctuations in the canals made them naviga-
ble waters within the meaning of section 10. No definition of naviga-
ble waters is included in the Rivers and Harbors Act. Thus, the
judicial definition in use at the time of the passage of the Act was
adopted." At that time in history only one definition of navigable
waters had been judicially set forth, the definition used to delineate
admiralty jurisdiction. "°
Admiralty jurisdiction, as it was originally adopted in the
United States, was confined to the seas and all waters within the
ebb and flow of the tide." Subsequently, and prior to enactment of
the Rivers and Harbors Act, the United States Supreme Court in a
case arising on the Great Lakes extended admiralty jurisdiction to
all "navigable" waters of the United States."2 The Court did not
indicate, however, whether the test for admiralty jurisdiction thus
became navigability for all waters of the United States or navigabil-
57. 526 F.2d at 1299 & n.14.
58. The court noted that the ebb and flow test was used to determine only whether
existing waters were navigable, but that "that is different from creating waters where none
previously existed and which do not 'alter' or 'modify.'" Id. at 1299 n.14. The ebb and flow
test has never been so qualified and has been used simply to determine whether any body of
water is navigable. See text accompanying footnotes 61-70, infra.
59. E.g., Hardy Salt Co. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 501 F.2d 1156, 1168 (10th Cir.
1974).
60. See Guinn, An Analysis of Navigable Waters of the United States, 18 BAYLOR L. REv.
559, 563 (1966); MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Histor-
ical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines That Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 511 (1975).
61. E.g., Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 464 (1847); Steamboat Orleans v.
Phoebus, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 175, 183 (1837); The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 428, 429 (1825). If the influence of the tide were at all present, admiralty jurisdiction
existed. Peyroux v. Howard, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 324, 343 (1833).
62. Propellor Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851). The Genesee
Chief case involved a collision on the Great Lakes and a constitutional challenge to a statute
which had extended admiralty jurisdiction to the Great Lakes. The Court upheld the statute
by concluding that ebb and flow of the tide was simply a descriptive phrase for navigable
waters and that, therefore, admiralty jurisdiction validly extended to all navigable waters.
Id. at 455. For an argument that this equating of ebb and flow of the tide with navigable
waters was simply a convenient fiction created by the Court, see MacGrady, The Navigability
Concept in the Civil And Common Law: Historical Development, Current Importance, and
Some Doctrines That Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 511, 569-77 (1975).
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ity for waters above the intertidal area, 3 and ebb and flow for tidal
waters. 4 In a later opinion, " the Supreme Court went on to define
what constituted navigable waters under this new test and noted in
passing that "[t]he doctrine of the common law as to the navigabil-
ity of waters has no application in this country. Here the ebb and
flow of the tide do not constitute the usual test, as in England, or
any test at all of the navigability of waters." 6
This case was the final decision of any significance in terms of
defining navigable waters prior to enactment of the Rivers and Har-
bors Act. After passage of the Act, courts took opposite views as to
whether the ebb and flow of the tide had any significance in the
determination of what were navigable waters under the Act. One
group of courts followed strictly the Supreme Court's final pro-
nouncement and held that ebb and flow of the tide had no signifi-
cance at all.6 7 Other courts distinguished the statement of the Su-
63. The term "intertidal area" will be used to refer to that portion of a waterway near
the coast which lies between the high water mark and the low water mark. It is used
synonymously with the term "tidal waters."
64. There are implications in the Genesee Chief opinion to support both positions. At
several points the Court spoke of determining whether jurisdiction should be extended above
the ebb and flow of the tide. 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 456-57. The Court also noted the unreasona-
bleness of measuring admiralty jurisdiction by the ebb and flow of the tide. Id.
Realistically, since the Court considered ebb and flow of the tide and navigability as
synonymous tests in intertidal areas, there was no need for the Court to choose between the
two. If the Court had felt it necessary to replace the ebb and flow test in intertidal areas, the
Court would have expressly overruled all of its previous decisions which had upheld the ebb
and flow test. But the Court did not, and overruled only one case, The Steamboat Thomas
Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825). Id. at 458-59.
The Thomas Jefferson was the first case in which the Supreme Court addressed the
geographic scope of admiralty jurisdiction. Conover, The Abandonment of the "Tidewater"
Concept of Admiralty Jurisdiction in the United States, 38 ORE. L. RFv. 34, 44 (1958). The
case involved a suit for seaman's wages brought in admiralty for a voyage on the Missouri
River. The Court, in a perfunctory opinion, held that admiralty jurisdiction would not lie
since the action occurred chiefly above the ebb and flow of the tide. Thus, when the Court in
the Genesee Chief overruled the Thomas Jefferson decision, it was overruling only the princi-
ple that admiralty jurisdiction could not exist above the ebb and flow of the tide and not the
ebb and flow test itself.
65. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
66. Id. at 563. The Daniel Ball case involved a libel filed against a ship engaged in
commerce solely upon a river in Michigan. The Court held that admiralty jurisdiction was
proper for the action. The Court did not analyze the validity of the ebb and flow test for
intertidal waters, but simply dismissed the test outright without providing any authority for
rejecting it. See Kramon, Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act: The Emergence of a New
Protection for Tidal Marshes, 33 MD. L. REV. 229, 241 n.70 (1973).
67. United States v. American Cyanamid, 354 F. Supp. 1202, 1204 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
Pitship Duck Club v. Town of Sequim, 315 F. Supp. 309, 310-11 (W.D. Wash. 1970); cf. Davis
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preme Court as dictum since the case had involved only activities
occurring above intertidal waters. These courts concluded that ebb
and flow of the tide was still the valid test for intertidal areas." The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit expressed the
view that the latter approach is the more logical of the two ration-
ales when it noted:
Stoeco would have us read The Daniel Ball and The Genesee
Chief as both an expansion and a contraction of admiralty juris-
diction; an expansion to non-tidal waters and a contraction, in
tidal waters, to areas of actual or reasonably potential navigabil-
ity. There is no reason to believe that anything other than an
expansion was intended, however. Subsequent decisions of the
Supreme Court do not suggest any contraction . . ..
Applied to the facts in the Sexton Cove case, the ebb and flow
test would appear to establish that the waters in the landlocked
canals became navigable waters within the meaning of section 10
when they first began to exhibit tidal fluctuations. Historically,
however, ebb and flow of the tide has had the connotation of a direct
surface connection and influence from the sea.7 In turn, the poten-
tial for maritime vessels to move in and out with the tide has also
always existed. Although the issue has never been considered, it
would thus be a logical conclusion that waters exhibiting tidal fluc-
tations, but without this direct connection to the sea, would not
conform to the traditional concepts of ebb and flow.
The plugged canals in Sexton Cove, by the very existence of
their plugs, did not have a direct surface connection to the sea.
Thus, without distorting the ebb and flow concept beyond its histor-
v. United States, 185 F.2d 938, 942 (9th Cir. 1950) (dictum) (ebb and flow of the tide is no
limitation or commerce clause power), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 932 (1951); Mintzer v. North
American Dredging Co., 242 F. 553, 560 (N.D. Cal. 1916) (held that ebb and flow of tide does
not necessarily demonstrate navigability of waterway), aff'd 245 F. 297 (9th Cir. 1917); Chi-
solm v. Caines, 67 F. 285, 292 (C.C.S.C. 1894) (test for navigability of stream is whether it
can be used as a highway of commerce); Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co. v. United States, 84 F.
Supp. 852, 866 (Ct. Cl. 1949) (dictum) (use as highway of commerce, not ebb and flow of tide,
determines navigability), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 982 (1950).
68. United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc. 498 F.2d 597, 609-10 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 927 (1975); United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 408 F. Supp. 42, 50 (D. Hawaii 1976)
(dictum); see United States v. Baker, 2 E.R.C. (BNA) 1849, 1850 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
69. United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 610 (3d Cir. 1974).
70. See Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 464 (1847); Peyroux v. Howard, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 324, 343 (1833).
[Vol. 31:697
NOTES
ical underpinnings, these canals could not be classified as navigable
waters. Although this is the same result as reached by the Fifth
Circuit,7 the difference in analysis is of no little significance."
Section 10 has undergone an extensive reshaping in terms of its
judicial construction as a result of the Fifth Circuit decision in
Sexton Cove. Especially noteworthy is the removal of the MHTL as
a limitation on the Corps' jurisdiction over navigable waters. Based
on Sexton Cove, the Corps now has permit authority over all activi-
ties which will effect, either because of ecological or navigational
damage, the course, condition, or capacity of navigable waters.
The significance of these changes, however, might be dismissed
by some as purely academic in light of the passage of the 1972
Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act" and the
judicial constructions given to those Amendments.7 4 Under these
Amendments the discharge of dredged or fill material into the wa-
ters of the United States, including the territorial seas, is prohibited
unless authorized by issuance of a Corps permit. 5
The courts have given an expansive meaning to these prohibi-
tions and have held that they are not limited to the traditional
Rivers and Harbors Act concepts of waters that are navigable in fact
and waters that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.7" Thus,
in recent cases involving challenges to the Corps' jurisdiction over
dredge and fill activities where the challenges were based both on
the Amendments and section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, the
71. 526 F.2d at 1299.
72. Consider, for example, a shallow intertidal bay which by its nature is not navigable
in fact and could not reasonably be made navigable, but is connected by a narrow opening
to a navigable bay. Using the Fifth Circuit's analysis, construction activities could take place
in the shallow bay and alter the condition, capacity or course of it, and no Corps permit would
be required under section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act. The Fifth Circuit would require
a Corps' permit as a prerequisite to the construction activities only if those activities would
have an effect on the outer navigable bay. Such a requirement would entail a substantial
burden of proof.
Under the ebb and flow test, however, the shallow intertidal bay would be considered a
navigable body of water within the meaning of section 10. Thus, the burden of proof to
establish the Corps' jurisdiction would require only a showing of effect by the construction
activities on the shallow bay.
73. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975).
74. E.g., United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 673 (M.D. Fla. 1974); United States
v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 364 F. Supp. 349, 350 (W.D. Ky. 1973).
75. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344, 1362(6), (7), (12) (Supp. V 1975).
76. E.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686
(D.D.C. 1975).
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courts have based their affirmations of jurisdiction solely on the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments.77 Under these
analyses, the permit authority under section 10 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act, although still a valid requirement, has been relegated
to a secondary status because of its narrower scope.7"
The backup status could suddenly change, however, in view of
legislative amendments currently under consideration by Con-
gress.7" In a bill passed in June of 1976 by the House of Representa-
tives, the definition of navigable waters for purposes of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act would be changed to limit the Corps'
dredge and fill jurisdiction to waters presently used or capable of
being used in interstate or foreign commerce and to their adjacent
wetlands.'" Although the Senate has not accepted this bill, it has
passed a bill of its own which would also restrict, though to a lesser
extent, the Corps' jurisdiction under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act." Thus, both branches of Congress intend to restrict to
some extent the Corps' jurisdiction under the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act. If this does occur, section 10 of the Rivers and
Harbors Act will receive renewed emphasis and Sexton Cove will be
at the forefront of judicial interpretations of its scope.
DONALD A. HAAGENSEN
77. Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 7 E.R.C. (BNA) 1311, 1314-15 (N.D. Cal. 1974); United
States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 676 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
78. Id.; see, Comment, Wetlands' Reluctant Champion: The Corps Takes a Fresh Look
at "Navigable Waters," 6 ENVT'L L. 217 (1975); Note, Federal Control of Wetlands: The
Effectiveness of Corps' Regulations Under § 404 of the FWPCA, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW., 505
(1976).
79. For an extensive discussion of these proposed amendments see Caplin, Is Congress
Protecting Our Water? The Controversy Over Section 404, Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 445 (1977) (this issue).
80. H.R. 9560, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. H5280 (1976). See COASTAL ZONE
MANAGEMENT NEWSLETTER, June 9, 1976, at 6.
81. S.2710, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. S15185 (1976). See COASTAL ZONE
MANAGEMENT NEWSLETTER, Sept. 8, 1976, at 2.
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